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Abstract  
Purpose – The study extends the debate on finance versus institutions in the promotion of 
investment documented by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Ali (2013) and Asongu (2014). 
We assess the effects of various components of governance on private investment, notably: 
political, economic and institutional governances. Financial indicators of depth, allocation 
efficiency, activity and size are used. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – An endogeneity robust dynamic system GMM estimation 
technique is employed. Principal component analysis is also employed to reduce the 
dimensions of governance variables. The empirical evidence is based on 53 African countries 
for the period 1996-2010.  
 
Findings – The findings provide support for the quality of governance as a better determinant 
of private investment than financial intermediary development. Moreover, the evidence of 
finance and governance as substitutes in their impact on investment implies that good 
governance fuels private investment and this positive impact is stronger in nations with less 
developed financial systems.  This finding is consistent with Ali (2013) and contrary to the 
results of Asongu (2014c). 
 
Practical implication – Policy measures for fighting involuntary and voluntary surplus 
liquidities are discussed. The paper provides additional support for the need of strengthening 
governance institutions to promote investment on the one hand and fighting financial 
allocation inefficiency by mitigating surplus liquidity issues on the other hand.  
 
Originality/value – The paper extends the debate on the substitution of finance and 
institutions in the promotion of private investment.  
 
JEL Classification: G20; G24; E02; P14; O55 
Keywords: Finance; Institutions; Investment: Property Rights; Africa 
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1. Introduction 
 The quality of institutions and financial development are critical determinants of a 
country’s investment climate. This is essentially because investment is a forward-looking 
adventure and entrepreneurs are for the most part, looking for a secured, stable (Aysan et al., 
2008, p.2), financially appealing (Asiedu et al., 2013) and less ambiguous (Le Roux & 
Kelsey, 2015ab) environment in which to invest. There is a twofold interest in the above 
narrative. On the one hand, good institutions potentially mitigate economic uncertainties 
which promote efficiency and hence, positive investment decisions. On the other hand, a good 
financial environment offers more possibilities for private investment due to increasing 
financial allocation efficiency: the fundamental mission of financial intermediation in 
transforming mobilized deposits into credit for private investment. In the light of the above, 
good institutions and finance improve the climate of investment by enhancing efficiency and 
reducing the cost of doing business.  
 African countries have been characterized by a plethora of private investment 
unfriendly features, inter alia: low financial development and surplus liquidity issues 
(Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009; Asongu, 2014a); poor institutional quality (Fosu, 2013ab); 
high infrastructural deficits (Apkan et al., 2014) and substantial levels of capital flight 
(Asongu, 2014b; Boyce & Ndikumana, 2001, 2003, 2011). This has led to a growing stream 
of studies in the African business literature on how to increase investment on the continent. 
The studies range from: broad determinants of investment (Anyanwu, 2012), to country-
specific solutions on private investment promotion as a viable alternative to multinational 
corporations (Rolfe & Woodward, 2004; Wamboye & Adekola, 2013). 
 The experience of Zambia in attracting investment after failed privatization and 
liberalization policies has implications for other African countries (Rolfe & Woodward, 
2004). This has led to a growing body of literature on determinants of investment in Africa. 
Consistent with Akpan et al. (2014) and Asongu and Nguena (2014), documented factors that 
promote investment are multidimensional and complex. These include, inter alia: estimation 
methods, contexts of studies, data spans and measurement of variables (Hajzler, 2014; Moosa, 
2002; Asiedu, 2002; Asiedu, 2006; Moosa & Cardak, 2006; Sekkat & Veganzones-
Varoudakis, 2007; Buchanan et al., 2012; Ranjan & Agrawal, 2011).  Hence, to the best of 
our knowledge, factors promoting investment in Africa could be classified into two principal 
streams:  business climate (infrastructure, trade openness, institutions, return…etc) and other 
factors (tenure security, weak land governance, regional factors, global economic shocks, 
resource-seeking…etc). We highlight them in the following two paragraphs.  
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 With regard to the first stream on doing business, Amengdolagine et al. (2013) have 
used 1400 corporations in 19 nations of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to investigate the motives 
of backward investment nexuses to conclude that the main drivers include: time, local 
partners and market factors. Asiedu (2002) has documented infrastructural availability and 
return on capital as the main determinants in SSA. The roles of infrastructure, market size and 
trade openness (Büthe & Milner, 2008; Vijayakumar et al., 2010;  Kinda, 2010; Bartels et al, 
2009; Jadhav, 2012; Darley, 2012; Anyanwu, 2012; Bartels et al., 2014; Akpan et al., 2014),    
incentive packages and labor costs (Tuomi, 2011; Vijayakumar et al., 2010; Bartels et al., 
2014) have been documented as well. At the level of institutional quality, the following 
factors are important: democracy (Asiedu & Lien, 2011), government effectiveness and 
regulatory quality (Jadhav & Katti, 2012), general domestic institutional quality (Asongu, 
2012; Neumayer & Spess, 2005; Gastanaga et al., 1998; Tuomi, 2011; Kinda, 2010; Bartels et 
al., 2014; Abdioglu et al., 2013; Cleeve, 2012) and low levels of political risk (Busse & 
Hefeker, 2007).  
 While the above narratives sustain the need for positive signals like good institutional 
quality, the second stream which entails private investment in terms of foreign land 
acquisitions for the most part, suggests the contrary. For instances, among others: Areski et al. 
(2013) do not find any significant nexus between the quality of business climate and 
investment; corruption does not significantly discourage investment in the BRICS and MINT 
countries
1
 (Akpan et al., 2014); Chinese investments in Africa are motivated by weak 
institutions (Kosltad & Wiig, 2011; Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013) and weak tenure laws in 
foreign land acquisitions (UN, 2010; Arezki et al., 2013; Economic Commission for Africa, 
2004;  Ingwe et al., 2010; Okoth-Ogendo, 2008; Wouterse et al., 2011; German et al., 2011; 
Thaler, 2013; Liu, 2013; Osabuohien, 2014). Other motives include: resource-seeking 
interests (UN, 2010; Kolstad & Wiig, 2011; Jadhav & Katti, 2012; Jadhav, 2012; Aleksynska 
& Havrylchyk, 2013; Rogmans & Ebbers, 2013; Lay & Nolte, 2014); global crises like 
financial and food shocks (Wouterse et al., 2011; UN, 2010; German et al., 2011; Clapp, 
2013; Isakson, 2013; Fairbairn, 2013) and regional features (Asiedu, 2002; Anyanwu, 2012; 
Aleksynska & Havrylchyk, 2013; Amendolagine et al., 2013; Yin & Vaschetto, 2011).   
 This inquiry complements existing literature in at least two ways. First, it extends the 
Ali (2013) and Asongu (2014c) debate on: (i) the measurement of property rights institutions 
(PRI) and (ii) complementarities between institutions and finance in the promotion of private 
                                                 
1
 While BRICS represents ‘Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa’, MINT stands for ‘Mexico, Indonesia, 
Nigeria and Turkey’.  
5 
 
investment. While Asongu (2014c) has employed a composite institutional indicator instead 
of Polity IV as postulated by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) in the measurement of PRI, we 
still know very little about the types of institutions that are most favorable to investment
2
. 
This paper addresses the concern by further decomposing the governance indicator used by 
Asongu (2014c) into its political (voice & accountability and political stability), economic 
(government effectiveness and regulation quality) and institutional (corruption-control and 
rule of law) components. In essence, the paper’s curiosity of assessing how different 
dimensions of governance promote private investment could have relevant policy 
implications.  
 Second, the study also contributes to the literature by investigating how structural 
constraints to African development could be addressed (unemployment, surplus liquidity, 
business unfriendly climate…etc). With growing evidence that rising unemployment on the 
continent would only be absorbed for the most part by public investment in the future 
(Asongu, 2013a), it extends the stream  of literature on promoting private investment 
(Anyanwu, 2006) by assessing the role of institutions versus finance. For the purpose, we 
employ all the four dimensions of financial intermediary development documented by the 
Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the World Bank, namely: deposits 
(financial depth), credit (financial activity), efficiency (transformation of deposits into credit) 
and financial size.   
 We briefly discuss the motivation for considering several governance indicators in the 
light of recent institutional literature.  Oluwatobi et al. (2015) have engaged six governance 
indicators when investigating the nexus between institutions and innovation in Africa to 
conclude that regulation quality and government effectiveness are the most relevant in 
enhancing the relationship. The effect of formal institutions on software piracy has been 
examined by Andrés and Asongu (2013) to  establish that the control of corruption is the most 
effective governance weapon in the fight against software piracy. This is broadly consistent 
                                                 
2
 “The Ali (2013, EB) findings on the nexuses among institutions, finance and investment could have an 
important influence on policy and academic debates. This paper relaxes his hypotheses on the conception, 
definition and measurement of finance and institutions because they are less realistic to developing countries to 
which the resulting policy implications are destined. We dissect with great acuteness the contextual 
underpinnings of financial development dynamics and elucidate why the Acemoglu & Johnson (2005) 
justification provided for the measurement of property rights institutions (PRI) is lacking in substance. Using 
updated data (1996-2010) from 53 African countries, we provide more robust evidence on the substitution of 
institutions and finance in investment. Results under many baseline and augmented scenarios are not consistent 
with the underlying paper. Justifications for the differences in findings are discussed. As a policy implication, the 
Ali (2013, EB) findings for countries with poor financial systems may not be relevant for Africa” (Asongu, 
2014c, p. 1557). 
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with Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2016) who have concluded on corruption-control being the 
most effective instrument in the fight against African conflicts and crimes. Andrés et al. 
(2015) have investigated the role of formal institutions on knowledge economy using the six 
governance indicators. In essence, there is a growing stream of literature on the relevance of 
bundling and unbundling governance for development outcomes, inter alia, in: (i) the 
prediction of the 2011 Arab Spring (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015a); (ii) asessing the role of 
lifelong learning (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016) and foreign aid (Asongu, 2015)  on political 
governnce and (iii) examining determinants of foreign direct investment in fast growing 
developing economies (Asongu, 2016). 
 The rest the study is organised as follows. The data and methodology are discussed in 
Section 2. Section 3 presents the empirical results while Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
 The study assesses a panel of 53 African nations with data of annual periodicity for the 
period 1996-2010 from World Bank Development Indicators and World Bank Governance 
Indicators databases. The choice of periodicity and countries has a twofold justification. First, 
we wish to remain consistent with the debate between Ali (2013) and Asongu (2014c). 
Second, institutional data from the World Bank is only available from 1996.  
 The dependent variable of Private investment is measured by Gross Private investment 
as percentage of GDP. The financial independent variables are appreciated in terms of 
financial dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size. The institutional indicators are 
extracted from Principal Component Analysis (PCA) which is discussed in Section 2.1.1. The 
control variables include: inflation, trade openness and economic prosperity. Trade openness 
and economic prosperity are expected to improve private investment while inflation should 
have the opposite effect. Accordingly, the former set (or trade and growth) is logically 
expected to be associated with more investment opportunities. Conversely, whereas 
low/stable inflation is conducive for investment opportunities, chaotic inflation is very likely 
to have the opposite effect because it provides a negative outlook on the return to investment.  
The variables which are defined in Appendix 1 are consistent with the studies 
motivating the inquiry. While the dependent and control variables are in line with Ali (2013) 
and Asongu (2014c), the financial variables are consistent with the latter author. The 
composite PRI indicator of Asongu (2014c) is decomposed into its political, economic and 
7 
 
institutional dimensions. The summary statistics and correlation analysis are presented in 
Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 respectively. 
 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 Principal Component Analysis  
 Consistent with the underlying literature (Asongu, 2013b, 2014c), there is potentially a 
very high rate of correlation or substitution between the governance indicators. This leads to 
some information redundancy. Hence, we employ PCA to mitigate the dimensions of the 
composite indicator employed by Asongu (2014c) into its economic, political and institutional 
components. The PCA is a statistical approach that has been substantially employed in 
Applied Econometrics to reduce a large set of correlated indicators into smaller components 
of uncorrelated variables known as principal components (PCs). The first PC represents a 
substantial part of variation or information in the initial data set. We use the Jolliffe (2002) 
and Kaiser (1974) criterion to retain the PCs for various governance dimensions. These 
authors have recommended dropping factors with an eigenvalue of less than one.  
 In Table 1, the first composite indicator of general governance used by Asongu 
(2014c) is decomposed into: Political governance (PolGov), Economic governance (EcoGov) 
and Institutional governance (InstGov). All corresponding governance dynamics have an 
eigenvalue of above one and display substantial variations in relation to the initial dataset, 
notably: 82.90% for PolGov, 90.60% for EcoGov and 93.50% for InstGov. Political 
governance captured by voice and accountability and political stability/no violence, is ‘the 
election and replacement of political leaders’. Economic governance which appreciates the 
formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public goods is measured with 
government effectiveness and regulation quality. Institutional governance which is the respect 
of the State and citizens of institutions that govern interactions between them is captured with 
corruption-control and the rule of law. These definitions and measurements are consistent 
with recent institutional literature (Andrés & Asongu, 2013).  
 On the relevance of PC-augmented regressors in terms of efficiency, consistency and 
inferential validity, we invite the interested reader to refer to Asongu and Nwachukwu 
(2015ab) who have confirmed such relevance after exploring a bulk of literature on the 
subject, inter alia: Westerlund and Urbain (2012, 2013ab).  
 
“Table 1 here” 
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2.2.2 Estimation Technique  
 The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation technique is employed, 
consistent with Ali (2013) and Asongu (2014c). The advantages of dynamic panel regressions 
have been substantially documented in the literature (Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2008; 
Asongu, 2013c)
3
.  Two points are worth emphasizing for goodness of fit. On the one hand, the 
conditions for the use of GMM are satisfied: N>T (53>5). On the other hand, the use of three-
year data averages enables us to restrict overidentification or limit the proliferation of 
instruments. Hence, the number of instruments is consistently lower than the number of 
countries across specifications.  
 The dynamic panel equations are as follows:  
titititititititititi IETFGovGovFPIPI ,,7,6,5,4,3,21,10,               (1)     
)()()()( 1,,41,,31,,22,1,11,,   titititititititititi FGovFGovGovGovFFPIPIPIPI                     
)()()()()( 1,,11,,71,,61,,5   tititttitititititi IIEETT                      (2) 
         
 Where: i  represents the country and t  stands for the period in years. Tau  is three 
because we have used three year data averages. PI  measures private investment; F , 
represents financial development dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity or size. Gov , denotes 
governance dynamics (political, economic or institutional); FGov , interaction between 
finance (F) and governance dynamics  (Gov); I , inflation; E , economic prosperity; T , trade 
openness; t  is a time-specific constant;  i  is a country-specific effect and;  ti ,  the error 
term.  
 Consistent with Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4), the System GMM approach (Arellano & 
Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) is preferred to the Difference estimator (Arellano & 
Bond, 1991). A two-step estimation procedure is adopted instead of a one-step approach 
because it is heteroscedasticity consistent. The second order autocorrelation test in difference 
(AR(2)) and Sargan overidentifying restrictions (OIR) tests are employed to ascertain the 
absence of autocorrelation in the residuals and validity of instruments respectively. It is also 
interesting to note that the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable are 
                                                 
3
 Relative to cross-country analysis, dynamic panel data analysis has three main advantages and one principal 
disadvantage. The former include: (i) the incorporation of both time-series and cross-sectional variations; (ii) 
time-invariant omitted variables are controlled for some bite on endogeneity and (iii) the System GMM approach 
eliminates small sample biases in the Difference estimator. On the latter, the estimates are interpreted as short-
run effects because data averages are employed to mitigate short-term disturbances that may loom substantially.  
 
9 
 
not contemporaneous because in the specifications, lagged levels of the independent variables 
are used as instruments in the difference equation (Eq. 2) and lagged differences of the 
independent indicators used as instruments in the level equation (Eq. 1). This enables the 
exploitation of orthogonal or parallel conditions between the lagged endogenous variable and 
the error term. 
 We briefly provide some discourse on marginal effects that is important for the sound 
interpretation of estimated coefficients.  Brambor et al. (2006) have substantially documented 
the pitfalls associated with interactive regressions. According to the authors, for 
corresponding interaction estimates to have economic meaning, they should be interpreted as 
conditional marginal effects. This line of interpretation is consistent with recent African 
development literature based on interactive regressions (Batuo, 2015).  
 
3. Empirical results and discussion  
3.1 Presentation of results  
 There are two principal concerns motivating this section, notably: (i) the independent 
effects of governance indicators and financial dynamics on private investment and (ii) the 
combined effects of governance and finance on the dependent variable. Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 
assess the nexuses with financial depth, efficiency, activity and size respectively. The models 
are consistently valid across specifications and tables because the null hypotheses of the 
AR(2) and Sargan OIR tests are overwhelmingly rejected
4
.  
 In Table 2, the following findings could be established. First, while governance 
dynamics significantly promotes private investment, the effect of financial depth (deposits) is 
not significant. The incidence from governance indicators in increasing order is significant in 
the political, economic and institutional dimensions. Second, the interaction of governance 
and finance on the dependent variable is not significant. This may imply financial deposits 
dampen the positive effect of governance dynamics on private investment. Third, the 
significant control variables display expected signs. Accordingly, while high inflation has a 
negative effect on private investment because of an unfavorable investment climate, 
                                                 
4
 As discussed in the methodology section, in order to investigate the validity of the models, two tests have been 
performed. (1) The Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test which examines the null hypothesis for the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals. (2) The Sargan OIR test which assesses the null hypothesis for the validity of 
instruments. Hence, rejection of the null hypotheses of both tests across tables and specifications implies the 
absence of autocorrelation in the residuals and validity of the instruments.  
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governance is endogenous to economic prosperity or growth in Africa (Anyanwu & 
Erhijakpor, 2014).  
 
“Table 2 here” 
 
 The results of financial efficiency (Table 3), financial activity (Table 4) and financial 
size (Table 5) in terms of institution-, finance-, interaction- and ‘control variable’- effects are 
broadly consistent with those of Table 2.  
 
“Tables 3-5 here” 
 
  
 
3.2 Robustness checks 
 
 For robustness checks, we employ a Roodman (2009ab) extension of Arellano and 
Bover (1995) that uses forward orthogonal deviations instead of first differences. The 
extension has the advantage of controlling for cross-sectional dependence and limiting 
instrument proliferation (see Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008). The specification is two-
step to account for heteroscedasticity because the one-step approach is homoscedasticity-
consistent. 
 Consistent with Asongu and De Moor (2015), four information criteria are used to 
examine the validity of estimated models. First, in order to ascertain the  absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond 
autocorrelation test in difference (AR(2)) should not be rejected. Second, the null hypotheses 
corresponding to the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests should 
also not be rejected for the validity of instruments. In essence, the Hansen (Sargan) test is 
robust (not robust) but weakened (not weakened) by instruments. Therefore, the modelling 
approach restricts over-identification and/or limits instrument proliferation by ensuring that in 
every specification the number of cross sections is higher than the corresponding number of 
instruments. Moreover, the Hansen OIR test is given preference compared to the Sargan OIR 
test because the former (latter) is based on heteroscedasticity (homoscedasticity). Third, the 
Fisher test is employed to assess the joint validity of estimated parameters. Fourth, the study 
also employs the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments to further 
examine the validity of the Hansen OIR test. 
 Two main findings are apparent in Tables 6-9 in relation to Tables 2-5. First, the 
results provide support for the quality of governance as a better determinant of private 
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investment than financial intermediary development. Second, the evidence of finance and 
governance as substitutes in their impact on investment implies that good governance fuels 
private investment and this positive impact is stronger in nations with less developed financial 
systems. While the first finding is consistent with those previously established, evidence of a 
decreasing marginal effect for substitution between governance and finance is now 
significant.  
 
“Tables 6-9 here” 
 
 
3.3 Discussion and policy implications 
 The results have shown that the interaction between finance and governance variables 
negatively affect private investment. The findings provide support for the quality of 
governance as a better determinant of private investment than financial intermediary 
development. This could be traceable to financial development inefficiencies that have been 
substantially documented in African financial institutions (Fouda, 2009; Saxagaard, 2006). 
These inefficiencies ultimately lead to surplus liquidity issues owing to information 
asymmetry (moral hazard and adverse selection).  
Let us also discuss how the findings converge with or diverge from existing literature 
in two strands. First, on the former perspective, the findings are broadly consistent with Ahlin 
and Pang (2008) who have established a substitution effect: the positive impact of finance on 
growth decreases with the progress of institutions. Second, the absence of a substantial 
finance-led- investment nexus is broadly inconsistent with the bulk of existing literature on, 
inter alia: developing (Ndikumana,  2000, 2005; Xu, 2000; Huang, 2006); Asian (Rousseau 
&Vuthipadadorn, 2005); European (Forssbaeck & Oxelheim, 2008) and developed (Love and 
Zichinno, 2006)  countries. To be more specific about sub-Saharan Africa, Misati and 
Nyamongo (2010) and Afangideh (2010) have also established a positive nexus. This 
difference can be elicited in the view that, the measure of financial development for the most 
part in the documented studies is ‘money supply’. Hence, as established by Asongu (2014d), 
significant differences in the response of investment to finance are apparent when all 
dimensions of the Financial Development and Structure Database of the World Bank are 
employed, notably, financial dynamics of: depth, efficiency, activity and size. In this paper, 
money supply is a component of financial depth.  
 Before suggesting policy recommendations in the fight against surplus liquidity, it is 
interesting to highlight how the financial variables employed in the study are: linked to each 
12 
 
other and, related to surplus liquidity. Accordingly, financial allocation efficiency is the 
ability of financial intermediary institutions to transform mobilized deposits (financial depth 
or liquid liability) into credit (financial activity) for investment purposes. Hence, the second 
indicator for financial efficiency may also be measured as a ratio of the third (financial 
activity) to the first (financial depth or deposits). Hence, high levels of financial inefficiency 
imply higher financial depth or liquid liabilities and lower financial activity or credit. In what 
follows, we suggest policy measures for reducing financial deposits, increasing financial 
activity and hence, improving financial efficiency. 
 We now discuss some policy initiatives that might be used to address the concern of 
surplus liquidity. Consistent with Asongu (2014a), the measures could either target ‘voluntary 
keeping’ of surplus liquidity or ‘involuntary holding’ of excess cash. First, ‘voluntary 
keeping’ of surplus cash by financial institutions can be curtailed by: (i) improving 
infrastructure in order to facilitate the transport of funds to remote bank branches; (ii) 
consolidating establishments that would facilitate inter-bank lending, especially for 
contingency motives and (iii) deterring banks from holding reserves above statutory ceilings, 
by easing constraints they face at the central bank in tracking their positions. Second, 
‘involuntary keeping’ of cash could also be substantially curtailed by: (i) improving the 
structures and efficiencies of regional and domestic stock markets in order to expand 
opportunities of investment for commercial banking institutions; (ii) increasing competition 
and mitigating asymmetric information in order to reduce the reluctance of banks to increase 
lending and (iii) improving the ability of banks to boost lending, especially when interest rates 
are subject to regulation. 
 The above policy measures will offer greater possibilities for private investment 
because of increasing financial allocation efficiency. Hence, the fundamental financial 
intermediation mission of transforming mobilized deposits into credit for private investment.  
 
4. Conclusion  
The study extends the debate on finance versus institutions in the promotion of investment 
documented by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Ali (2013) and Asongu (2014). We assess the 
effects of various components of governance on private investment, notably: political, 
economic and institutional governances. Financial indicators of depth, allocation efficiency, 
activity and size are used. An endogeneity-robust dynamic system GMM estimation technique 
is employed. Principal component analysis is also employed to reduce the dimensions of 
governance variables. The empirical evidence is based on 53 African countries for the period 
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1996-2010. The findings provide support for the quality of governance as a better determinant 
of private investment than financial intermediary development. Moreover, the evidence of 
finance and governance as substitutes in their impact on investment implies that good 
governance fuels private investment and this positive impact is stronger in nations with less 
developed financial systems. This finding is consistent with Ali (2013) and contrary to the 
results of Asongu (2014c). On practical the implications, policy measures for fighting 
involuntary and voluntary surplus liquidities are discussed. The paper provides additional 
support for the need of strengthening governance institutions to promote investment on the 
one hand and fighting financial allocation inefficiency by mitigating surplus liquidity issues 
on the other hand.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Governance (Gov) 
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
First PC (G.Gov) 0.383 0.374 0.403 0.429 0.443 0.413 0.773 0.773 4.642 
Second  PC 0.297 0.774 -0.369 -0.350 -0.021 -0.230 0.077 0.851 0.466 
Third PC 0.750 -0.300 0.353 -0.127 -0.223 -0.396 0.066 0.917 0.398 
          
First PC (PolGov) 0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.829 0.829 1.659 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.170 1.000 0.340 
          
First PC (EcoGov) --- --- 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.906 0.906 1.812 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.093 1.000 0.187 
          
First PC (InstGov) --- --- --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.935 0.935 1.871 
Second PC --- --- --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.064 1.000 0.128 
          
Note: P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: 
Government Effectiveness. PS: Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. G.Gov (General Governance): 
First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. PolGov (Political Governance): First PC of VA & PS. EcoGov 
(Economic Governance): First PC of RQ & GE. InstGov (Institutional Governance): First PC of RL & CC.   
Source: Authors’ computation.  
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Table 2: Financial Depth (Liquid Liabilities), institutions and private investment  
          
 Dependent Variable: Private Investment  
 Political Governance (PolGov) Institutional Governance (InstGov) Economic Governance (EconGov) 
Priv. Invt. (-1) 0.370* 0.460** 0.460** 0.407** 0.453** 0.453** 0.406** 0.468*** 0.468*** 
 (0.085) (0.017) (0.017) (0.048) (0.012) (0.012) (0.041) (0.005) (0.000) 
Constant  5.216*** 5.115*** 5.115*** 5.431*** 5.509*** 5.509*** 4.748*** 4.869*** 4.869*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.009) (0.002) (0.000) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.000) 
Growth  0.379** 0.286* 0.286* 0.322* 0.306* 0.306* 0.312* 0.283* 0.283* 
 (0.024) (0.069) (0.069) (0.062) (0.052) (0.052) (0.073) (0.079) (0.079) 
Inflation -0.000*** -0.030** -0.030** -0.000*** -0.025* -0.025* -0.000*** -0.029** -0.029** 
 (0.000) (0.018) (0.018) (0.000) (0.072) (0.072) (0.000) (0.026) (0.026) 
Trade  0.015 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.013 0.008 0.008 
 (0.426) (0.792) (0.792) (0.810) (0.853) (0.853) (0.489) (0.713) (0.713) 
Fin. Depth (FD) --- 4.122 --- --- 1.234 --- --- 2.320 --- 
  (0.232)   (0.745)   (0.570)  
PolGov 0.824** 0.461 0.461 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.047) (0.351) (0.351)       
InstGov --- --- --- 1.256*** 0.998* 0.998** --- --- --- 
    (0.002) (0.068) (0.068)    
EconGov --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.182*** 0.839 0.839 
       (0.003) (0.135) (0.135) 
PolGov*FD --- --- -1.966 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.232)       
InstGov*FD --- --- --- --- --- -1.891 --- --- --- 
      (0.745)    
EconGov*FD --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -4.069 
         (0.570) 
          
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) 0.828 0.742 0.742 0.775 0.732 0.732 0.783 0.728 0.728 
 (0.407) (0.457) (0.457) (0.438) (0.463) (0.463) (0.433) (0.466) (0.466) 
Sargan OIR 8.143 9.570 9.570 7.970 9.201 9.201 8.090 9.683 9.683 
 (0.419) (0.296) (0.296) (0.436) (0.325) (0.325) (0.424) (0.288) (0.288) 
Wald  (joint) 213.47*** 42.34*** 42.34*** 217.76*** 73.09*** 73.092*** 233.26*** 71.072*** 71.072*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries 46 41 41 46 41 41 46 41 41 
Instruments  17 18 18 17 18 18 17 18 18 
Observations  162 141 141 162 141 141 162 141 141 
          
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order 
Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The 
significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no 
autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Fin: Financial. 
Priv. Invt: Private Investment. Not all constitutive terms enter into third specifications because of perfect 
multicollinearity.  
Source: Authors’ computation. 
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Table 3: Financial Efficiency, Institutions and Private Investment  
          
 Dependent Variable: Private Investment  
 Political Governance (PolGov) Institutional Governance (InstGov) Economic Governance (EconGov) 
Priv. Invt. (-1) 0.370* 0.345 0.345 0.407** 0.377 0.377 0.406** 0.398* 0.398* 
 (0.085) (0.168) (0.168) (0.048) (0.123) (0.123) (0.041) (0.068) (0.068) 
Constant  5.216*** 6.174** 6.174** 5.431*** 6.479*** 6.479*** 4.748*** 6.099** 6.099** 
 (0.004) (0.016) (0.016) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) 
Growth  0.379** 0.358* 0.358* 0.322* 0.365* 0.365* 0.312* 0.327* 0.327* 
 (0.024) (0.066) (0.066) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.073) (0.078) (0.078) 
Inflation -0.000*** -0.029** -0.029** -0.000*** -0.020 -0.020 -0.000*** -0.025** -0.025** 
 (0.000) (0.013) (0.013) (0.000) (0.120) (0.120) (0.000) (0.035) (0.035) 
Trade  0.015 0.021 0.021 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.013 0.013 0.013 
 (0.426) (0.305) (0.305) (0.810) (0.687) (0.687) (0.489) (0.444) (0.444) 
Fin. Efficiency 
(FE) 
--- -0.366 --- --- -0.755 --- --- -1.040 --- 
  (0.678)   (0.397)   (0.301)  
PolGov 0.824** 0.701 0.701 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.047) (0.155) (0.155)       
InstGov --- --- --- 1.256*** 1.287** 1.287** --- --- --- 
    (0.002) (0.012) (0.012)    
EconGov --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.182*** 1.225** 1.225** 
       (0.003) (0.025) (0.025) 
PolGov*FE --- --- 0.174 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.678)       
InstGov*FE --- --- --- --- --- 1.157 --- --- --- 
      (0.397)    
EconGov*FE --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.824 
         (0.301) 
          
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) 0.828 0.755 0.755 0.775 0.707 0.707 0.783 0.710 0.710 
 (0.407) (0.450) (0.450) (0.438) (0.479) (0.479) (0.433) (0.477) (0.477) 
Sargan OIR 8.143 6.850 6.850 7.970 6.798 6.798 8.090 6.689 6.689 
 (0.419) (0.552) (0.552) (0.436) (0.558) (0.558) (0.424) (0.570) (0.570) 
Wald  (joint) 213.47*** 107.54*** 107.54*** 217.76*** 100.32*** 100.32*** 233.26*** 125.84*** 125.84*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries 46 41 41 46 41 41 46 41 41 
Instruments  17 18 18 17 18 18 17 18 18 
Observations  162 136 136 162 136 136 162 136 136 
          
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order 
Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The 
significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no 
autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Fin: Financial. 
Priv. Invt: Private Investment. Not all constitutive terms enter into third specifications because of perfect 
multicollinearity.  
Source: Authors’ computation. 
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Table 4: Financial Activity, Institutions and Private Investment  
          
 Dependent Variable: Private Investment   
 Political Governance (PolGov) Institutional Governance 
(InstGov) 
Economic Governance (EconGov) 
Priv. Invt. (-1) 0.370* 0.408** 0.408** 0.407** 0.429*** 0.429*** 0.406** 0.424*** 0.424*** 
 (0.085) (0.011) (0.011) (0.048) (0.005) (0.005) (0.041) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  5.216*** 5.503*** 5.503*** 5.431*** 5.865*** 5.865*** 4.748*** 5.201*** 5.201*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
Growth  0.379** 0.345* 0.345* 0.322* 0.342** 0.342** 0.312* 0.350* 0.350* 
 (0.024) (0.057) (0.057) (0.062) (0.047) (0.047) (0.073) (0.076) (0.076) 
Inflation -0.000*** -0.032** -0.032** -0.000*** -0.024 -0.024 -0.000*** -0.029* -0.029* 
 (0.000) (0.022) (0.022) (0.000) (0.103) (0.103) (0.000) (0.050) (0.050) 
Trade  0.015 0.016 0.016 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.013 0.014 0.014 
 (0.426) (0.467) (0.467) (0.810) (0.795) (0.795) (0.489) (0.478) (0.478) 
Fin. Activity 
(FA) 
--- 1.330 --- --- -0.718 --- --- -0.730 --- 
  (0.635)   (0.727)   (0.788)  
PolGov 0.824** 0.545 0.545 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.047) (0.296) (0.296)       
InstGov --- --- --- 1.256*** 1.198** 1.198** --- --- --- 
    (0.002) (0.040) (0.040)    
EconGov --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.182*** 1.108* 1.108* 
       (0.003) (0.074) (0.074) 
PolGov*FA --- --- -0.634 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.635)       
InstGov*FA --- --- --- --- --- 1.101 --- --- --- 
      (0.727)    
EconGov*FA --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.279 
         (0.788) 
          
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) 0.828 0.727 0.727 0.775 0.708 0.708 0.783 0.674 0.674 
 (0.407) (0.467) (0.467) (0.438) (0.478) (0.478) (0.433) (0.500) (0.500) 
Sargan OIR 8.143 8.973 8.973 7.970 8.901 8.901 8.090 9.683 9.683 
 (0.419) (0.344) (0.344) (0.436) (0.350) (0.350) (0.424) (0.287) (0.287) 
Wald  (joint) 213.47*** 49.950*** 49.95*** 217.76*** 73.18*** 73.18*** 233.26*** 85.55*** 85.55*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries 46 41 41 46 41 41 46 41 41 
Instruments  17 18 18 17 18 18 17 18 18 
Observations  162 141 141 162 141 141 162 141 141 
          
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order 
Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The 
significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no 
autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Fin: Financial. 
Priv. Invt: Private Investment. Not all constitutive terms enter into third specifications because of perfect 
multicollinearity.  
Source: Authors’ computation. 
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Table 5: Financial Size, Institutions and Private Investment   
          
 Dependent Variable: Private Investment  
 Political Governance (PolGov) Institutional Governance (InstGov) Economic Governance (EconGov) 
Priv. Invt. (-1) 0.370* 0.374 0.374 0.407** 0.415** 0.415** 0.406** 0.428* 0.428 
 (0.085) (0.101) (0.101) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.041) (0.055) (0.055) 
Constant  5.216*** 3.651 3.651 5.431*** 5.422* 5.422* 4.748*** 4.620 4.620 
 (0.004) (0.302) (0.302) (0.002) (0.083) (0.083) (0.004) (0.113) (0.113) 
Growth  0.379** 0.322* 0.322* 0.322* 0.289 0.289 0.312* 0.261 0.261 
 (0.024) (0.071) (0.071) (0.062) (0.131) (0.131) (0.073) (0.179) (0.179) 
Inflation -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade  0.015 0.003 0.003 0.004 -0.005 -0.005 0.013 0.001 0.001 
 (0.426) (0.832) (0.832) (0.810) (0.725) (0.725) (0.489) (0.926) (0.926) 
Fin. Activity 
(FS) 
--- 3.575 --- --- 1.025 --- --- 1.183 --- 
  (0.304)   (0.774)   (0.749)  
PolGov 0.824** 0.687 0.687 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.047) (0.236) (0.236)       
InstGov --- --- --- 1.256*** 1.190** 1.190** --- --- --- 
    (0.002) (0.035) (0.035)    
EconGov --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.182*** 1.194** 1.194** 
       (0.003) (0.044) (0.044) 
PolGov*FS --- --- -1.705 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.304)       
InstGov*FS --- --- --- --- --- -1.570 --- --- --- 
      (0.774)    
EconGov*FS --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -2.075 
         (0.749) 
          
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) 0.828 0.709 0.709 0.775 0.679 0.679 0.783 0.711 0.711 
 (0.407) (0.477) (0.477) (0.438) (0.496) (0.496) (0.433) (0.477) (0.477) 
Sargan OIR 8.143 8.543 8.543 7.970 9.356 9.356 8.090 8.022 8.022 
 (0.419) (0.382) (0.382) (0.436) (0.313) (0.313) (0.424) (0.431) (0.431) 
Wald  (joint) 213.47*** 239.57*** 239.57*** 217.76*** 243.25*** 243.25*** 233.26*** 262.95*** 262.95*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries 46 45 45 46 45 45 46 45 45 
Instruments  17 18 18 17 18 18 17 18 18 
Observations  162 156 156 162 156 156 162 156 156 
          
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order 
Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The 
significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no 
autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Fin: Financial. 
Priv. Invt: Private Investment. Not all constitutive terms enter into third specifications because of perfect 
multicollinearity.  
Source: Authors’ computation. 
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Table 6: Financial Depth (Liquid Liabilities), institutions and private investment  
          
 Dependent Variable: Private Investment  
 Political Governance (PolGov) Institutional Governance (InstGov) Economic Governance (EconGov) 
Priv. Invt. (-1) 0.500*** 0.700*** 0.700*** 0.446*** 0.620*** 0.620*** 0.561*** 0.575*** 0.575*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  5.140*** 6.619*** 6.619*** 3.913 7.071*** 7.071*** 3.935 6.615*** 6.615*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.216) (0.000) (0.000) (0.168) (0.000) (0.000) 
Growth  0.141 -0.022 -0.022 0.340*** 0.082 0.082 0.167* 0.074 0.074 
 (0.318) (0.807) (0.807) (0.006) (0.419) (0.419) (0.062) (0.430) (0.430) 
Inflation -0.0005** -0.008 -0.008 0.00006 -0.014 -0.014 0.00005 -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.023) (0.521) (0.521) (0.848) (0.264) (0.264) (0.902) (0.127) (0.127) 
Trade  0.016 -0.054*** -0.054*** 0.023 -0.029** -0.029** 0.014 0.005 0.005 
 (0.324) (0.000) (0.000) (0.570) (0.020) (0.020) (0.696) (0.641) (0.641) 
Fin. Depth 
(FD) 
--- 9.343*** --- --- 5.590* --- --- -1.769 --- 
  (0.004)   (0.096)   (0.582)  
PolGov 2.394*** 0.585 0.585 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.532) (0.532)       
InstGov --- --- --- 3.298** 1.080 1.080 --- --- --- 
    (0.027) (0.156) (0.156)    
EconGov --- --- --- --- --- --- 2.980** 2.616*** 2.616*** 
       (0.018) (0.001) (0.001) 
PolGov*FD --- --- -4.456*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.004)       
InstGov*FD --- --- --- --- --- -8.564* --- --- --- 
      (0.096)    
EconGov*FD --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 3.101 
         (0.582) 
          
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) (0.200) (0.266) (0.266) (0.210) (0.264) (0.264) (0.177) (0.253) (0.253) 
AR(2) (0.402) (0.434) (0.434) (0.607) (0.438) (0.438) (0.536) (0.419) (0.419) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.319) (0.702) (0.702) (0.080) (0.303) (0.303) (0.186) (0.625) (0.625) 
          
DHT for 
instruments 
         
(a)Instruments 
in levels 
         
H excluding 
group 
(0.831) (0.675) (0.675) (0.206) (0.502) (0.502) (0.190) (0.476) (0.476) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(0.148) (0.582) (0.582) (0.098) (0.231) (0.231) (0.264) (0.611) (0.611) 
(b) IV (years, 
eq(diff)) 
         
H excluding 
group 
(0.153) (0.593) (0.593) (0.060) (0.231) (0.231) (0.353) (0.410 (0.410) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(0.948) (0.711) (0.711) (0.399) (0.569) (0.569) (0.101) (0.985) (0.985) 
          
Fisher  154.58*** 246.33*** 246.33*** 257.13*** 179.57*** 179.57*** 462.66*** 131.64*** 131.64*** 
Instruments  22 26 26 22 26 26 22 26 26 
Countries  47 43 43 37 43 43 47 43 43 
Observations  163 143 143 163 143 143 163 143 143 
          
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen 
Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The 
significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher 
statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Fin: Financial. Priv. Invt: Private Investment. Not all 
constitutive terms enter into third specifications because of perfect multicollinearity. 
Source: Authors’ computation. 
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Table 7: Financial Efficiency, Institutions and Private Investment 
          
 Dependent Variable: Private Investment  
 Political Governance (PolGov) Institutional Governance 
(InstGov) 
Economic Governance (EconGov) 
Priv. Invt. (-1) 0.500*** 0.535*** 0.535*** 0.446*** 0.408*** 0.408*** 0.561*** 0.458*** 0.458*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  5.140*** 3.126 3.126 3.913 -1.581 -1.581 3.935 -4.719* -4.719* 
 (0.000) (0.148) (0.148) (0.216) (0.602) (0.602) (0.168) (0.056) (0.056) 
Growth  0.141 0.090 0.090 0.340*** 0.407*** 0.407*** 0.167* 0.207*** 0.207*** 
 (0.318) (0.181) (0.181) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.062) (0.001) (0.001) 
Inflation -0.0005* -0.021* -0.021* 0.00006 0.015 0.015 0.00005 0.001 0.001 
 (0.023) (0.059) (0.059) (0.848) (0.206) (0.206) (0.902) (0.861) (0.861) 
Trade  0.016 0.008 0.008 0.023 0.038 0.038 0.014 0.044** 0.044** 
 (0.324) (0.526) (0.526) (0.570) (0.134) (0.134) (0.696) (0.032) (0.032) 
Fin.Efficiency 
(FE) 
--- 4.852** --- --- 5.727 --- --- 11.41*** --- 
  (0.042)   (0.109)   (0.003)  
PolGov 2.394*** 0.844 0.844 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.131) (0.131)       
InstGov --- --- --- 3.298** 3.343*** 3.343*** --- --- --- 
    (0.027) (0.000) (0.000)    
EconGov --- --- --- --- --- --- 2.980** 1.180 1.180 
       (0.018) (0.263) (0.263) 
PolGov*FE --- --- -2.314** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.046)       
InstGov*FE --- --- --- --- --- -8.774 --- --- --- 
      (0.109)    
EconGov*FE --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -20.00*** 
         (0.003) 
          
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) (0.200) (0.259) (0.259) (0.210) (0.296) (0.296) (0.177) (0.262) (0.262) 
AR(2) (0.402) (0.399) (0.399) (0.607) (0.588) (0.588) (0.536) (0.522) (0.522) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.319) (0.628) (0.628) (0.080) (0.367) (0.367) (0.186) (0.582) (0.582) 
          
DHT for 
instruments 
         
(a)Instruments 
in levels 
         
H excluding 
group 
(0.831) (0.896) (0.896) (0.206) (0.726) (0.726) (0.190) (0.571) (0.571) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(0.148) (0.366) (0.366) (0.098) (0.209) (0.209) (0.264) (0.497) (0.497) 
(b) IV (years, 
eq(diff)) 
         
H excluding 
group 
(0.153) (0.665) (0.665) (0.060) (0.595) (0.595) (0.353) (0.509) (0.509) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(0.948) (0.353) (0.353) (0.399) (0.107) (0.107) (0.101) (0.572) (0.572) 
          
Fisher  154.58*** 98.98*** 98.98*** 257.13*** 63.40*** 63.40*** 462.66*** 165.37*** 165.37*** 
Instruments  22 26 26 22 26 26 22 26 26 
Countries  47 41 41 37 41 41 47 41 41 
Observations  163 136 136 163 136 136 163 136 136 
          
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen 
Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The 
significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher 
statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Fin: Financial. Priv. Invt: Private Investment. Not all 
constitutive terms enter into third specifications because of perfect multicollinearity.  
Source: Authors’ computation. 
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Table 8: Financial Activity, institutions and private investment  
          
 Dependent Variable: Private Investment  
 Political Governance (PolGov) Institutional Governance (InstGov) Economic Governance (EconGov) 
Priv. Invt. (-1) 0.500*** 0.592*** 0.592*** 0.446*** 0.544*** 0.544*** 0.561*** 0.564*** 0.564*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  5.140*** 7.484*** 7.484*** 3.913 6.553*** 6.553*** 3.935 6.078*** 6.078*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.216) (0.000) (0.000) (0.168) (0.000) (0.000) 
Growth  0.141 0.064 0.064 0.340*** 0.221** 0.221** 0.167* 0.170** 0.170** 
 (0.318) (0.418) (0.418) (0.006) (0.024) (0.024) (0.062) (0.048) (0.048) 
Inflation -0.0005* -0.039*** -0.039*** 0.00006 -0.036*** -0.036*** 0.00005 -0.021* -0.021* 
 (0.023) (0.001) (0.001) (0.848) (0.002) (0.002) (0.902) (0.056) (0.056) 
Trade  0.016 -0.011 -0.011 0.023 -0.0004 -0.0004 0.014 0.002 0.002 
 (0.324) (0.496) (0.496) (0.570) (0.976) (0.976) (0.696) (0.826) (0.826) 
Fin. Activity 
(FA) 
--- 1.814 --- --- 2.936 --- --- 0.027 --- 
  (0.594)   (0.223)   (0.992)  
PolGov 2.394*** 0.275 0.275 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.716) (0.716)       
InstGov --- --- --- 3.298** 0.581 0.581 --- --- --- 
    (0.027) (0.338) (0.338)    
EconGov --- --- --- --- --- --- 2.980** 1.887* 1.887* 
       (0.018) (0.060) (0.060) 
PolGov*FA --- --- -0.865 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.954)       
InstGov*FA --- --- --- --- --- -4.498 --- --- --- 
      (0.223)    
EconGov*FA --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.048 
         (0.992) 
          
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) (0.200) (0.267) (0.267) (0.210) (0.280) (0.280) (0.177) (0.265) (0.265) 
AR(2) (0.402) (0.397) (0.397) (0.607) (0.463) (0.463) (0.536) (0.450) (0.450) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.319) (0.266) (0.266) (0.080) (0.347) (0.347) (0.186) (0.376) (0.376) 
          
DHT for 
instruments 
         
(a)Instruments 
in levels 
         
H excluding 
group 
(0.831) (0.785) (0.785) (0.206) (0.868) (0.868) (0.190) (0.814) (0.814) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(0.148) (0.120) (0.120) (0.098) (0.150) (0.150) (0.264) (0.187) (0.187) 
(b) IV (years, 
eq(diff)) 
         
H excluding 
group 
(0.153) (0.234) (0.234) (0.060) (0.206) (0.206) (0.353) (0.251) (0.251) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(0.948) (0.429) (0.429) (0.399) (0.860) (0.860) (0.101) (0.755) (0.755) 
          
Fisher  154.58*** 266.00*** 266.00*** 257.13*** 314.69*** 314.69*** 462.66*** 140.98*** 140.98*** 
Instruments  22 26 26 22 26 26 22 26 26 
Countries  47 43 43 37 43 43 47 43 43 
Observations  163 143 143 163 143 143 163 143 143 
          
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen 
Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The 
significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher 
statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Fin: Financial. Priv. Invt: Private Investment. Not all 
constitutive terms enter into third specifications because of perfect multicollinearity. 
 Source: Authors’ computation. 
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Table 9: Financial Size, institutions and private investment  
          
 Dependent Variable: Private Investment  
 Political Governance (PolGov) Institutional Governance (InstGov) Economic Governance (EconGov) 
Priv. Invt. (-1) 0.500*** 0.581*** 0.581*** 0.446*** 0.622*** 0.622*** 0.561*** 0.602*** 0.602*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  5.140*** 3.742 3.742 3.913 3.786 3.786 3.935 1.566 1.566 
 (0.000) (0.187) (0.187) (0.216) (0.352) (0.352) (0.168) (0.642) (0.642) 
Growth  0.141 0.123 0.123 0.340*** 0.118 0.118 0.167* 0.181* 0.181* 
 (0.318) (0.175) (0.175) (0.006) (0.218) (0.218) (0.062) (0.069) (0.069) 
Inflation -0.0005* -0.0005 -0.0005 0.00006 0.000 0.000 0.00005 0.00003 0.00003 
 (0.023) (0.130) (0.130) (0.848) (0.979) (0.979) (0.902) (0.882) (0.882) 
Trade  0.016 -0.040** -0.040** 0.023 -0.012 -0.012 0.014 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.324) (0.024) (0.024) (0.570) (0.436) (0.436) (0.696) (0.459) (0.459) 
Fin. Size(FS) --- 6.514** --- --- 2.363 --- --- 5.341 --- 
  (0.013)   (0.444)   (0.163)  
PolGov 2.394*** 0.806* 0.806* --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.085) (0.085)       
InstGov --- --- --- 3.298** 2.363*** 2.363*** --- --- --- 
    (0.027) (0.000) (0.000)    
EconGov --- --- --- --- --- --- 2.980** 2.673*** 2.673*** 
       (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) 
PolGov*FS --- --- -3.107** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.013)       
InstGov*FS --- --- --- --- --- -5.894 --- --- --- 
      (0.444)    
EconGov*FS --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -8.183 
         (0.163) 
          
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) (0.200) (0.211) (0.211) (0.210) (0.173) (0.173) (0.177) (0.192) (0.192) 
AR(2) (0.402) (0.501) (0.501) (0.607) (0.489) (0.489) (0.536) (0.557) (0.557) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.319) (0.406) (0.406) (0.080) (0.299) (0.299) (0.186) (0.256) (0.256) 
          
DHT for 
instruments 
         
(a)Instruments 
in levels 
         
H excluding 
group 
(0.831) (0.848) (0.848) (0.206) (0.510) (0.510) (0.190) (0.493) (0.493) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(0.148) (0.198) (0.198) (0.098) (0.224) (0.224) (0.264) (0.190) (0.190) 
(b) IV (years, 
eq(diff)) 
         
H excluding 
group 
(0.153) (0.343) (0.343) (0.060) (0.244) (0.244) (0.353) (0.328) (0.328) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(0.948) (0.523) (0.523) (0.399) (0.503) (0.503) (0.101) (0.206) (0.206) 
          
Fisher  154.58*** 176.63*** 176.63*** 257.13*** 261.14*** 261.14*** 462.66*** 318.50*** 318.50*** 
Instruments  22 26 26 22 26 26 22 26 26 
Countries  47 46 46 37 46 46 47 46 46 
Observations  163 157 157 163 157 157 163 157 157 
          
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen 
Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The 
significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher 
statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Fin: Financial. Priv. Invt: Private Investment. Not all 
constitutive terms enter into third specifications because of perfect multicollinearity.   
Source: Authors’ computation. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions (Measurement) Sources 
    
 
Political Stability  
 
PolSta 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Voice & 
Accountability  
V&A “Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent to 
which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government and to enjoy freedom of expression, freedom 
of association and a free media”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Political 
Governance  
Polgov First Principal Component of Political Stability and Voice & 
Accountability. The process by which those in authority are  
selected and replaced. 
           PCA 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness 
 
Gov. E 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality of 
public services, the quality and degree of independence from 
political pressures of the civil service, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
governments’ commitments to such policies”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Regulation  
Quality  
RQ “Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic 
Governance  
Ecogov First Principal Component of Government Effectiveness and 
Regulation Quality. The capacity of government to formulate 
& implement policies, and to deliver services.  
              PCA 
    
 
Rule of Law  
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Corruption-
Control  
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Institutional 
Governance  
Instgov First Principal Component of Rule of Law and Corruption-
Control. The respect for citizens and the state of institutions  
that govern the interactions among them 
PCA 
    
General 
Governance  
G.gov First Principal Component of Political, Economic and 
Institutional Governances   
PCA 
    
Inflation  Infl Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
GDP growth  GDPg Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade Openness Trade Export plus Imports of Commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Private 
Investment 
PrivIvt Gross Private Investment (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Financial  system 
Depth  
LLgdp Liquid Liabilities (% of GDP) World Bank 
(FDSD) 
    
Financial System 
Efficiency  
 FcFd Financial credit on Financial deposit World Bank 
(FDSD) 
    
Financial System 
Activity  
Pcrbof Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial 
institutions (% of GDP) 
World Bank 
(FDSD) 
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Financial System 
Size  
Dbacba Deposit bank assets on (Deposit bank assets plus Central bank 
assets) 
World Bank 
(FDSD) 
    
Note: WDI: World Bank Development Indicators. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. PCA: 
Principal Component Analysis. P.C: Principal Component. V& A: Voice & Accountability. R.L: Rule of Law. R.Q: 
Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. 
 
 
 
. Appendix 2: Summary statistics  
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Political Stability -0.571 0.952 -3.229 1.143 265 
Voice & Accountability  -0.679 0.730 -2.161 1.047 265 
Political Governance  -0.016 1.291 -3.204 2.621 264 
Government Effectiveness  -0.678 0.610 -1.847 0.761 255 
Regulation Quality  -0.681 0.674 -2.573 0.868 265 
Economic Governance  0.049 1.310 -3.019 3.290 254 
Rule of Law -0.703 0.686 -2.550 1.018 265 
Control of Corruption  -0.598 0.622 -2.344 0.971 265 
Institutional Governance 0.008 1.378 -3.879 3.179 264 
Private Investment  13.075 9.115 -0.540 85.913 231 
Inflation 56.191 575.70 -45.335 8603.3 230 
Trade Openness  78.340 39.979 20.980 250.95 247 
GDP Growth 4.755 5.587 -11.272 49.367 254 
Financial Depth  0.254 0.214 0.023 0.962 205 
Financial Efficiency 0.748 0.414 0.158 2.575 195 
Financial Activity  0.197 0.239 0.007 1.681 205 
Financial Size 0.710 0.249 0.019 1.436 251 
      
Note: S.D: Standard Deviation.   
Source: Authors’ computation.  
 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation Analysis 
             
Financial Development Control variables Institutions Priv. 
Invt. 
 
Fdgdp FcFd Pcrbof Dbacba GDPg Trade Inflation PolGov InstGov EcoGov G.Gov  
1.000 0.078 0.689 0.456 -0.115 0.244 -0.066 0.458 0.677 0.589 0.616 0.165 Fdgdp 
 1.000 0.667 0.268 -0.075 -0.166 -0.119 0.104 0.162 0.290 0.211 -0.013 FcFd 
  1.000 0.431 -0.109 0.023 -0.068 0.365 0.537 0.603 0.540 0.077 Pcrbof 
   1.000 -0.083 0.154 -0.068 0.411 0.470 0.531 0.517 0.240 Dbacba 
    1.000 0.179 -0.132 -0.012 -0.084 -0.041 -0.049 0.536 GDPg 
     1.000 0.024 0.202 0.207 0.089 0.174 0.469 Trade 
      1.000 -0.114 -0.136 -0.169 -0.149 -0.089 Inflation 
       1.000 0.819 0.758 0.901 0.199 PolGov 
        1.000 0.878 0.957 0.220 InstGov 
         1.000 0.945 0.225 EcoGov 
          1.000 0.229 G.Gov 
           1.000 Priv. Invt 
             
Note: Fdgdp: liquid liabilities. FcFd: Financial credit on financial deposit. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by 
deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on deposit bank assets plus central 
bank assets. GDPg: GDP growth rate. PolGov: Political Governance. InstGov: Institutional Governance. 
EcoGov: Economic Governance. G. Governance: Governance.  
Source: Authors’ computation.  
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